Using a large data set including over 7,000 households in the four most important cities of Colombia, this paper studies the relationship between the kidnap victimization probability a household faces with its migration decision. The key identifying exclusion restriction is that the upper tail of the neighborhood inequality afects directly the kidnap victimization probability but not the household migration decision. We …nd that while the kidnap victimization probability has a positive and statistically signi…cant e¤ect on the household's international migratory decision it has no e¤ect on the domestic one. We also …nd evidence supporting the theory that there may be a positive selection of urban migrants from Colombia. This …nding contradicts Borja's "negative selection theory" of migrants from less developed countries and supports the idea that a "brain drain" from Colombia is taking place.
Introduction
Although not necessarily obvious, the migration and violence literatures have some aspects in common. Both strands have emphasized the e¤ects of income inequality on crime and migration rates respectively. The crime and violence literature suggests that higher income inequality may be "causing" higher crime rates [Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (2002a) and (2002b)]. The migration literature suggests that higher inequality may in ‡uence the type of "self-selected"migrants that leave a country [Borjas (1987) , Chiquiar and Hanson (2002) , Liebig and Souza-Poza (2004) ]. This paper is a …rst attempt to link the two literatures by arguing that income inequality has a positive e¤ect on the kidnap victimization probability a household faces, and that this risk increases the likelihood of their emigrating abroad.
Most migration studies concentrate on analyzing the e¤ects of networks and wage di¤erentials on migration decisions of individuals and/or households. Naturally, migration may also occur for other reasons, such as the possibility of being kidnapped for ransom. This topic has not been addressed before in the economic literature, to the best of our knowledge. There might be several reasons for this. First, not all countries in the world su¤er from high enough levels of kidnaps to induce signi…cant migration of the potential victims. Even though it seems rather intuitive to argue that higher levels of violence could imply higher levels of migration, there are several trade-o¤s a household must take into account before it decides to migrate. For example, high migration costs accompanied by labor uncertainty may hinder household's migration even if they are likely or have been victims of a violent crime.
A second reason that can explain the lack of research in this topic may be related to the lack of suitable data and the fact that kidnapping is not a common enough event to generate a large enough sample. Moreover, many forms of violence (such as homicides, suicides, or sexual assault) are not motivated primarily by economic motives. Kidnaps and robbery, however, are primarily motivated by pecuniary considerations and therefore allows standard economic theories of rational choice to be applied.
Using a large data set including over 7,000 households in the four most important cities of Colombia, we are able to overcome these two limitations mentioned above. We …rst study the determinants of the likelihood of individuals being kidnapped, and show that the weight in the upper tail of the income distribution of a given neighborhood has a signi…cant positive e¤ect on the kidnap probability after controlling for various household and neighborhood characteristics. Hence increases in both local mean income and inequality are associated with a higher likelihood of being kidnapped. We then study the e¤ect of kidnap probability (as predicted by household and neighborhood characteristics) on the migration decision of a household. The identi…cation assumption underlying this is that local income inequality does not directly a¤ect migration decisions of individual households, after controlling for households income and wealth and neighborhood characteristics. We …nd a signi…cant positive correlation between predicted kidnap probabilities and likelihood of international migration, though not of domestic migration. We also …nd evidence against Borjas'theory of negative selection of migrants from less developed countries to developed countries. In summary, our results provide evidence for the view that high levels of income inequality are associated with high kidnap risks for more educated and wealthier individuals in Colombia, generating a non-negligible "brain drain"out of Colombia. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The …rst part introduces two simple models where the relationship between income inequality, kidnap risk and migration decisions at the household level is made explicit. Section two describes the data set used while the third section describes the empirical approach and the identi…cation of the kidnap victimization probability. The fourth section discusses the estimation results and checks some issues concerning identi…cation and robustness. The …fth section draws some connections with the violence and migration literatures. Finally the sixth section concludes.
Conceptual Framework
In this section we outline a conceptual framework that allows us to link the kidnapping victimization probability a household faces and its decision to send some of its members abroad. The kidnap model is a very simple model and it shows explicitly the way we believe rational kidnappers maybe choosing their potential victims under uncertainty. Moreover it allows us to specify the determinants of the kidnap victimization probability a household faces. We then consider a more standard income pooling household model in which a household decides optimally whether to send members abroad or not depending on the kidnap victimization probability they face and other determinants.
Kidnaps and Wealth Inequality
Even though real life kidnaps could in principle be resolved through a bargaining process between the kidnapper and the victim's family, in this paper we abstract from this possibility and assume that the kidnapper has all the bargaining power. In this case a kidnapper's behavior resembles that of a monopolist that unanimously sets a uniform price in a segmented market and where we assume that the targeted household will always want to pay the demanded ransom as long as it has the resources to do so. However, there usually exists imperfect credit markets which implies that targeted households are only able to …nance the demanded ransom through their own income and wealth.
Consider a rational risk neutral kidnapper whose only objective is to obtain a monetary reward or ransom from a victim's family that resides in a given neighborhood n where the city is partitioned in M of these, i.e. n = 1; ::; M . The kidnapper faces an information constraint since the wealth level of a household i, denoted W i;n , is usually uncertain for him and should be modeled as a random variable. That is, he needs to predict the wealth a given household has. To do so a rational kidnapper will take into account the environment or neighborhood a household resides in because presumably households self-select themselves into neighborhoods depending on their wealth.
We assume that all households across neighborhoods have the same preferences and therefore only di¤er in their wealth. Let the wealth level W i;n of household i be uniformly distributed in a mean preserving way over the support [w n m n ; w n + m n ] 2 R ++ where w n is the mean wealth in neigh-borhood n and m n is the measure of wealth dispersion or inequality in the neighborhood. Moreover, assume the kidnapper knows the wealth distribution within each neighborhood n and is able to observe a vector of household characteristics that would serve as a signal for him to predict whether the a household has enough wealth to pay the demanded ransom. We interpret these observable characteristics as durable household consumption goods, such as the ownership of a car, house/apartment, membership to a private club or other household durable consumption.
Therefore, a kidnapper forms a belief on the probability that household type i in neighborhood n has enough wealth to pay the demanded ransom given that the household was able to buy a durable good which serves as a signal for him. To simplify as much as possible let us assume that the economy produces only two consumption goods: durable (d) and non-durable goods (c) with constant returns to scale technology in perfectly competitive markets. Let us normalize the price of the consumption good to one and denote by P > 1 the publicly known price of the durable consumption good. Given that a kidnapper observes that a household has enough wealth to purchase the durable good he forms the following belief q i (R n ) = Pr (R n W i;n w n + m n = P W i;n w n + m n )
that household i will be able to pay the demanded ransom R n , where we assume R n P . 1 This probability is represented by the dark gray area in Figure 1 .
We can calculate explicitly (1) for the uniform distribution
1 In real world situatuions kidnap ransoms are not usually a …xed absolute amount of money. Kidnappers in most cases demand ransom levels that the household of an abducted victim can a¤ord to pay. For example, it is reasonable to believe that a ransom demanded to a household that lives in a rich neighborhood is higher than that demanded to a household that lives in a less wealthy area. Of course, if a kidnapper had perfect information about household i's income level, he would demand a ransom that would be just enough for the household to meet and that would give him a positive pro…t after executing this criminal act. w n -m n P w n R n w n +m n n m 2 1 Figure 1 : The probability q i (R n ) that the kidnapper forms.
Notice that @q i (Rn) @Rn = 1 wn+mn P < 0 which makes a lot of sense: as the demanded ransom increases in neighborhood n the probability that any household type i is able to pay it decreases ceteris paribus.
We consider that the uncertainty a kidnapper faces can be reduced to only two states of the world given that a kidnapper abducts a victim of household type i in neighborhood n: with probability q i the kidnapper receives the demanded ransom R n and with probability 1 q i he does not. In case the kidnapper receives the demanded ransom he then releases the victim while if he does not then he executes the victim for reputational considerations. We assume there are two types of cost that a rational kidnapper faces when kidnapping a victim: abducting and hiding costs. The former ones, denoted by b n , vary according to the type of household that is targeted in neighborhood n and includes the cost of physically abducting a victim. The latter ones, denoted h, include the cost of feeding and hiding each victim. The cost of releasing a victim is zero while that of executing her is given by e > 0 per victim. The opportunity cost plus other non-state contingent costs that a kidnapper incurs can be represented as a sunk cost C > 0.
Under these assumptions the expected pro…t a kidnapper has from abducting a member of household type i in neighborhood n is
Hence if the kidnapper decides to abduct N n victims from neighborhood n then his total expected pro…t of abducting, hiding and feeding them is
where we assume that the cost of feeding and hiding N n victims can be represented by an increasing convex variable cost function c(
Given that (3) is a concave function in N n and R n the …rst order conditions characterize well the solution:
It can be shown that the optimal ransom and number of abductee's in any given neighborhood are
From this solution some interesting comparative statics are in order
where the last line uses that R n P . As mean wealth and inequality in a neighborhood increases the optimal ransom, expected pro…ts and abductee's increase. If households are aware up to some extent of the way kidnappers choose their victims then we can postulate that a household's perception of their kidnap victimization probability should be a non-decreasing function of the number of kidnap victims N n in their own neighborhood. This relationship can be denoted by p i (N n ) where p 0 i 0.
Kidnap Victimization Risk and Migration
To model the relationship between the kidnap victimization probability a household perceives and its decision to send some its members abroad we use a standard unitary household Becker type income pooling model where households'utility is represented by a Cobb-Douglas function. It is assumed each household has a binary decision to make: i) To work in the country in which the household resides either dedicated to own-household business'or in labor markets and which we call "stayers ", or ii) To send some members abroad where eventually they must work and which we call "international migrants".
These two choices will be denoted a = 0; 1 respectively. In case the household decides to send one or more of its members abroad it will incur in some migration costs denoted m and are assumed to be a positive constant fraction of the households wealth.
The pooled wealth of the household may consist of labor income, nonlabor income and assets
where $ a denotes the real wage obtained by the household which depends on the migration decision the household takes and on the education level S i of its members, I i;a denotes non-labor income which may consist of capital income and/or remittances from household members abroad among other things and …nally A i;a represents assets such as bonds, stocks and properties. We assume that besides the negative impact kidnaps may have in the direct utility, it also leads to a pecuniary cost for the household due to the ransom demanded by the kidnapper. This ransom will be a fraction of the pooled wealth of household i denoted by i 2 [0; 1].
Under these assumptions, the maximum level of utility that the household would enjoy by choosing activity a is given by the following log-linear indirect utility function
where X i is a vector of household characteristics, K ia is an indicator function that takes the value of one if a member of the household has been a victim of kidnap in the domestic country and zero otherwise and M i is another 2 More precisely we assume that the log-linear Cobb-Douglas utility funcition is given by indicator function that takes the value of one if the household has allocated a member abroad.
Since households face uncertainty about being a kidnap victim we take an expected indirect utility approach similar to Day (1992) . Household i will prefer allocation 0 to allocation 1 if and only if it yields a higher expected utility
The binary choice model is very simple and may seem to overlook some important determinants of migration. Nonetheless, many such variables can be included through the vector X i which makes the framework less restrictive. Let us notice for our purposes that all else equal, since i < 1, the higher i perceives its kidnap victimization probability the lower the expected utility of the household and therefore the more likely for some of it's members to migrate.
Data
Colombia is known to be one of the most violent countries in the world. It has three di¤erent armed groups …ghting inside its boundaries, it is one of the export leaders of illegal drugs in the world, terrorist attacks are a common threat and its homicide rates is the highest in Latin America. Unfortunately, its kidnaps rates are also high and it is a type of violence that has been a¤ecting its citizens for years. According to a recent Article in The Economist "... half of all the world's kidnaps occur in Latin America. Colombia has long been the world leader: Kroll (a security company based in New York) reckons 4,000 kidnaps took place there last year (just 2,043, says the government). But Mexico is now in second place, with 3,000 cases, ahead of Argentina (2,000), according to Kroll." 3 Table A shows data reported by Pais Libre, a non-pro…t NGO that offers integral services to the kidnap victims of Colombia. It can be seen that approximately 200 people are kidnapped per month in the country. Furthermore, as is shown in Table B , the data also supports the idea that kidnapping is a type of violence that occurs primarily for economic reasons. Out of the 2201 kidnaps made in 2003, approximately 66% of them had an economic extortion intention. These characteristics, united with the existence of a very rich data set, makes Colombia an ideal country to empirically test the theoretical framework described above.
The data base used in this study is the Encuesta Social. This is an ongoing Colombian household survey developed by Fedesarrollo and the World Bank in a semiannual basis since 1999 whose objective is to measure the living standards of the households and their opinions about di¤erent aspects of their daily life. Until now, seven surveys have been …elded in the four major cities of Colombia (Bogota, Medellin, Barranquilla and Cali); in some of the rounds additional cities were also occasionally included. In view of the fact that questions about both kidnaps and migration were only introduced in September of 2000 we restricted the sample to the last …ve rounds. For the remaining of the paper we will use information on 13941 households randomly sampled in these four cities.
The Encuesta Social is a unique data set suited for this study in several aspects. In contrast to several macro-level data sets previously used in other studies of violence 4 , the Encuesta Social is a micro-level data survey which is convenient to answer questions about the behavior at the household level that comes as a reaction against violence. Given that information on kidnap victimization as well as on international migration is available, the theoretical models described can be tested.
Kidnap and Migration Data from Encuesta Social
The questions related to violence in general asked every household if in the past six months any of its members had been a victim of some form of violence. If they answered yes to this question they were then asked to specify the type of crime(s) they were victims of. As can be seen in Table 1 in the appendix, 16% of the households had at least one member who was a victim of some kind of crime in the six months previous to the survey. More than 80% of these households were victims of a robbery while nearly 4% of them lost a member through homicide. The data also shows that 0.16% of the households in the biggest cities in Colombia have been victims of kidnap. Interestingly kidnappers do not seem only target households that reside in the relatively wealthier neighborhoods which provides evidence for the market segmentation theory. For instance, 0.45% of the households that reside in the poorest neighborhoods in Colombian cities have been victims of this crime. Of course this percentage is much higher in the richest neighborhoods were it reaches 7.8%.
Information about migration in the survey comes from two questions asked to households. The questionnaire asks the respondent if any of the household's members had migrated in the past six months seeking better income opportunities. In case the answer was a¢ rmative the respondent had then to specify if the migration occurred to another city or town within Colombia or if it was to another country. Out of the 11309 households who answered this question, 9.5% of them had a member who in the past six months had migrated. Table 2 in the appendix shows that within these households, migration was evenly divided between domestic and international migration.
The survey includes additional socioeconomic characteristics of the households that we use in the empirical approach as control variables which are described in more detail in the appendix.
Neighborhood Data from Encuesta Social
The kidnap conceptual framework assumes that a kidnapper operates within neighborhood's that partition or segment the city in clusters. To take into account this empirically we used the location inside the city where the household resides. In Colombia cities are divided into six di¤erent areas called "estratos", numbered in an ascending order from one to six. It is a division determined by the cities and is used, among other things, to cross-subsidize the costs of public services. More importantly they are geographically dis-persed along the city boundaries. It is the case that wealthier households normally reside in higher estratos (estratos 5 and 6) where both the basic living costs and the average costs of the real state are higher compared to the lower ones (estratos 1 and 2). According to this division 47% of the households reside in a low income strata (estratos 1 and 2), 45% in a medium income strata (estratos 3 and 4) and only 8% reside in a high income strata (estratos 5 and 6). It is important to emphasize that kidnaps do ocurr in all strata not only in wealthier strata. We used this exogenous partition of the the six strata for each city to create the clusters or neighborhoods within cities. The clusters are de…ned by strata (6 in total), round survey (4 in total that had all the necessary information) and cities (4 major cities: Bogota, Medellin, Cali and Barranquilla) which gives a total of 96 clusters.
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These were used to create the two measures of inequality as well as the mean monthly expenditure by cluster used in the empirical speci…cations.
Empirical Approach
Consistent with the conceptual framework, the empirical approach consists on a two stage estimation procedure where we …rst estimate the kidnap victimization probability for each household and then estimate the impact that this probability has on its migration decision.
Two Stage Estimation Procedure
From the kidnapping conceptual framework, we have that i;n is the expected pro…t that the kidnapper obtains from kidnapping a member of household i in neighborhood n predicted by him based on some observable characteristics that the households have. Therefore in the …rst stage we assume that this expected pro…t, unobservable for the econometrician, is given by the following function
where Y i;n and Z i;n include observable socioeconomic characteristics of household i and some characteristics of neighborhood n in which it resides while i;n are unobservable household characteristics for the econometrician (but not for the kidnapper) independent and normally distributed in the population. Since we only observe a binary variable that speci…es whether or not a member of a household has been a kidnap victim in the recent past (i.e. six months) previous to the survey we follow a standard latent variable approach. Let
be an indicator function equal to one if the kidnapper obtains a non-negative pro…t from kidnapping a member of household i in neighborhood n and zero otherwise. Under the assumptions made, the estimated kidnap probability of household i will be given by the following probit speci…cation
where is the standard normal distribution.
In the second stage we evaluate then the e¤ect that this kidnap risk has on the migration decision of a household. We assume that the household's indirect utility function V i , unobservable for the econometrician, that comes from equation (4) and can be decomposed in the following manner
where the random component i represents the e¤ect that unobservable characteristics for the econometrician have on household i's utility and it is assumed to be identical, independent and normally distributed over the population. As in the …rst stage, we only observe a binary variable that speci…es whether or not a member of household i has migrated to an international destination in the six months previous to the survey. We follow again a standard latent variable approach
where M i is an indicator function equal to one if at least one member of household i migrates internationally and zero otherwise. Therefore, the estimated probability that at least one member of household i will migrate to an international destination will be given by the following probit speci…cation
Identi…cation of the Kidnap Victimization Probability
The identi…cation of b p i (a constructed regressor) in the second stage could come from two di¤erent methods. The …rst one is based on using an identifying restriction while the second one takes advantage of the functional form of the non linear model in the estimation procedure. In the former case, an identifying restriction requires that there should exist at least one variable that directly a¤ects the kidnap probability of household i, but only a¤ects in an indirect manner its migration decision through p i . This is the distinction between the vectors Y i;n and Z i;n above for the …rst stage. While Y i;n can include characteristics related with a household's wealth and neighborhood that may a¤ect both the probability of being kidnapped and its decision to migrate, Z i;n should be composed by variables that include at least a variable that only a¤ects directly the perceived household kidnap victimization probability p i and not directly its migration decision. In the functional form case, the e¤ect of b p i is identi…ed due to the nonlinearity of the second stage estimation procedure giving the possibility for all the variables in the …rst stage to be used in the second one.
We propose that the wealth inequality within a neighborhood directly a¤ects the kidnap likelihood a household faces while only indirectly its migration decision serving as an identi…cation variable. From the theoretical model inequality within the neighborhood increases the victimization probability and hence should be included in the …rst stage of the estimation. Although inequality is thought to also in ‡uence migration decisions we argue that it is inequality in the country/city and not that within a neighborhood the one which should in ‡uence migration decisions. What should in ‡uence the decision to migrate is how good or bad a person's wealth/income draw is in the city and not how rich or poor a person is relatively within his or her neighborhood. Intuitively, the poorest household from the richest neighborhood in a city is much better-o¤ than the mean household in the city. Therefore, the fact that this household got a bad draw within the neighborhood income distribution should not be a decisive variable for its migration decision. Similarly, the richest household in the poorest neighborhood will probably be worse-o¤ than the mean household in the city and hence could seriously consider migration as a possibility to obtain a better income.
We construct therefore vector Z i;n by including a measure of neighborhood wealth inequality (proxied by household expenditure inequality) plus observable characteristics that a kidnapper may take into account like ownership of a car and the quality of the apartment or house a household lives in. Although the extra variables included in the vector Z i;n are related to the wealth level of household i, we argue that they do not explain the decision to migrate if we control adequately for their pooled wealth in the second stage. The vector Y i;n includes several neighborhood and household characteristics like the mean monthly expenditure of households within the neigborhood, the education level of the head of the household, its square, the monthly per capita expenditure of the household, its square, the total number of members of the household as well as the total number of children in the household and if the head of the household is the head of a business.
There are two types of measures of inequality within a neighborhood that are consistent with our conceptual framework: a) inequality of the whole neighborhood income distribution and b) inequality only of the upper tail of the income distribution. We used one of each for the estimation procedure. For type a) we constructed a Gini coe¢ cient calculated for each neighborhood (or cluster), while for type b) we constructed the proportion of households that have an expenditure level above the 60th percentile of the whole expenditure distribution in the sample. 6 While the …rst inequality measure does not distinguish if an increase in inequality comes from either an increase of relatively rich households or poor households within the neighborhood the second measure focuses only on the upper tail of the income distribution within the neighborhood, namely, an increase or decrease of the proportion of relatively rich households that reside within the neighborhood.
Estimation Results

First Stage: Kidnap Victimization Probability
The estimation results of the …rst stage are reported in Table 4 in the appendix. The columns report the probit estimation of the kidnap victimization probability including in all models city and round survey dummies. All speci…cations include household relevant characteristics corresponding to Y i;n such as: i) education level of the head of the household (measured in years) and its square, ii) monthly per capita expenditure of the household (measured in millions of the currency) and its square, iii) total number of members of the household as well as total number of children in the household and iv) if the head of the household is a patron or head of a business. The per capita expenditure and schooling of a household are probably not perfectly observable by a kidnapper, nonetheless, we believe a perpetrator can observe a noisy proxy of them. For example, these variables may be related with social activities a household realizes such as going to social clubs, eating out in certain type of restaurants and of course the type of job the head of the household has, all of which might enter into the perpetrator's perceived economic and social status of the household. On the other hand, the number of members within a household clearly is an observable variable a kidnapper has to take into account to decide which of them he will abduct. The …rst speci…cation in Table 4 simply includes these basic household characteristics and the results suggest that even though they are not individually signi…cant they are jointly signi…cant as the Wald test shows.
The second and third speci…cations include the variables in the vector Z i;n . The only di¤erence between these is the measure of inequality used. The second speci…cation in Table 4 uses the Gini coe¢ cient in each cluster while the third speci…cation uses the proportion of households with an expenditure level above the 60th percentile of the expenditure distribution in the sample. As mentioned above the other household characteristics included in Z i;n are given by: i) building quality materiales of the house or apartment in which the household resides and ii) ownership of a car. These variables capture other household observable characteristics about their social status and wealth.
The results from Models II to V in Table 4 suggest that owning a car, residing in a relatively high quality house and whose head is a patron are signi…cantly more likely to be victims of a kidnap. Both types of inequality measures used to identify the kidnap victimization probability are positive and statistically signi…cant at a 5% signi…cance level. The marginal e¤ects are not small. In particular an increase of a standard deviation (around 0.1 in the Gini scale) increases the kidnap victimization probability in 0.17%. This is a big e¤ect since the mean value of the kidnap victimization proability is 1.1%. On the other hand an increase of a standard deviation (0.21) of the proportion of households above the 60th percentile that reside in the neighborhood increases the kidnap victimization probability in 0.3% which is even bigger.
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Second Stage: Probability of International Migration
The estimation results of the second stage for international migration are reported in Table 5 in the appendix. The …rst column shows that the fact that a member of a household is actually kidnapped has a signi…cant in ‡uence in the household decision to migrate to another country. Model I in Table  5 has as dependent variable the decision to migrate abroad and as clearly shown if a member of the household was actually kidnapped the probability that at least one of its members migrates to another country increases in a statistically signi…cant way controlling for several household characteristics.
However, as explained in the theoretical framework, our interest is to evaluate how the threat or risk of a kidnap a¤ects the household migration decision. Using the …rst stage results we calculated the kidnap victimization probability for each of the households in the sample for the two inequality measures. With these estimates of b p i we then ran equation (8) to obtain an estimate of p . The second and third speci…cations in Table 5 report the probit estimation of the international migration probability the predicted kidnap victimization probability using the Gini coe¢ cient, while the fourth and …fth speci…cations use the proportion of households above the 60th percentile of the expenditure distribution in the sample.
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In all models we included several household characteristics that a¤ect the household's migration decision and which are consistent with the conceptual framework such as: i) education level of the household (approximated by household head's schooling), ii) per-capita expenditure of the household, iii) gender of household head iv) average age of household and v) number of members in the household. We included other variables that proxy the pooled resources or wealth of the household which relevant in the migration decision such as: vi) ownership of a …rm with more than …ve employee's, vii) sales of assets within six months of the survey, viii) ownership of the place in which the household lives in and ix) if the household has always resided in the same city.
Models II and IV suggest that that the corresponding kidnap victimization probability is statistically signi…cant at the 10% and 5% signi…cance levels respectively even in the presence of all the controls. In passing by it is important to emphasize that relatively wealthy and educated households tend to migrate more. Furthermore, households with a male head, with more members and with a relatively higher average age tend to migrate also more. Finally, households that own a …rm with more than …ve employee's and that sell their assets (i.e. a proxy variable for wealth resources households need to …nance migration expenses) also tend to migrate more.
The distinguishing feature of models II and III (respectively models IV and V) for a given kidnap victimization probability (i.e. that uses a particular inequality measure) is whether there is a member who is currently unemployed in the household, since as several migration studies have emphasized, households tend to migrate to insure themselves against negative income shocks.
11 Moreover, under the Beckerian pooled income household framework a negative income shock might be correlated with the unemployment level that the household faces. For example, if a member of the household loses his/her job, given that there are no unemployment welfare bene…ts in Colombia, it might be reasonable to believe that the migration likelihood of the household might increase. This could be a factor that if not controlled for might a¤ect indirectly the kidnap victimization probability and bias our results. Therefore, we decided to include in Models III and V, for the corresponding inequality measure used to calculate the kidnap vicitimization probability, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a member of the household was currently unemployed at the tiem of the survey. The results show that this variable has a positive although not statistically signi…cant e¤ect in the migration decision of the household. Furthermore, neither the coe¢ cient nor the level of signi…cance of the kidnap victimization probability in either speci…cation is a¤ected by including this control.
Quantitatively it is important to compute the marginal response probability of sending abroad a member if the kidnap risk increases. All else equal an increase of a standard deviation (i.e. 0.034) in the kidnap victimization probability which uses the Gini coe¢ cient, (respectively 0.026 if the upper tail inequality measure is used) increases by 0.38% (respectively 0.41%) on average the probability of migrating abroad.
12 It should be stated that the 95% con…dence interval for the kidnap victimization probability that uses the Gini coe¢ cient is [0.001, 0.22] (respectively [0.03, 0.28] for the upper tail inequality measure). Notice that the lower end of the interval is positive, hence even if our point estimate suggests a high magnitude the con…dence interval shows that the marginal e¤ect is still at least 0.01% (respectively 0.08% for the other inequality measure).
Functional Form Identi…cation
We wanted to explore up to what extent there is a functional form identi…ca-tion of the kidnap victimization probability, even though we believe that an identifying restriction, as the one discussed above, is a more appealing way to do it. Table 6 reports the second stage with all regressors used in both the …rst as well as the second stage. To save space we just report the kidnap victimization probability and the regressors used in the …rst stage. Relying on the non linearity of the estimation procedure the kidnap victimization probability is not robust to the inclusion of all variables in either speci…ca-tion. The variable that causes this is the variable "ownership of a car " as speci…cations II and IV show. This seems strange since the robustness of the kidnap probability victimization is not a¤ected by the inclusion of all the other wealth related variables. There is no intuitive explanation for this but it does show the limits of relying on a functional form identi…cation of the kidnap probability.
Domestic Migration and Robbery Victimization Probability
In order to check whether or not we are really capturing the e¤ect that the threat of kidnapping has on the international migration decision of urban Colombian households we decided to carry out two more empirical exercises. The …rst one consists on evaluating the e¤ect that the likelihood of being kidnapped has on the domestic migration decision of the household. Unfortunately, kidnap is a crime that seems to be present across Colombia. Table  C in the appendix shows that in the past few years there does not exist a single province or state within the country where no case of kidnapping was reported. Furthermore, with the exception of a few states, it seems evenly distributed among them. Hence, it is expected that the migration decision to a domestic destination should not be a¤ected by the likelihood of a member of the household of being kidnapped since the threat would still be present. To test this hypothesis we decided to drop all the households that had a member migrating internationally and only considered as dependent binary variable the choice of a household between staying in the same city and the choice of at least one member migrating to another destination within the country. In other words, we followed the same methodology applied to international migration to estimate the e¤ect that the threat of kidnap may have on the domestic migration decision of the household. As seen in Table 7a in the appendix, neither the actual fact of being kidnapped nor its likelihood have a signi…cant e¤ect on the domestic migration decision of the household.
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The second empirical exercise that we did was to evaluate robberies, which is another pecuniary related type of violent crime, has an e¤ect on the migration decisions of the households. We wanted to see if our estimation procedure based only on kidnaps was generating the result spuriously. Although robbery also has a clear pecuniary motive behind it, the economic and psychological costs imposed to the victim are normally much smaller than those imposed by kidnaps. Hence it is expected that neither the actual fact of being robbed nor its likelihood should have a signi…cant e¤ect on a household's decision to migrate. We re-did the two stage estimation procedure only with the Gini coe¢ cient as a measure of inequality but using the threat of robbery instead of kidnaps. 14 In the …rst stage of this robustness test we obtained the probability that at least a member of a household is robbed using the exact same explanatory variables used in the …rst stage of the kidnapping probability. Although not reported, several regressors in this stage were individually signi…cant like the inequality measure, the mean monthly expenditure per cluster as well as the education level. Furthermore, the Wald test of 132 with 17 degrees of freedom showed us that jointly all the regressors have explanatory power. Models I through IV in Table 7b of the appendix show the results for the second stage 13 Multinomial logit regressions were also done and the same result is obtained: the threat of kidnap only a¤ects international migration decisions. These results are available from the authors at request.
14 The results are the same if the probability of being robbed is calculated using the other inequality measure of the number of households that have an expenditure level above the 60th percentile of the expenditure distribution.
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of international and domestic migration 15 . The results are as expected: the coe¢ cients on actual robbery and its likelihood are not signi…cant in either of the regressions.
Selection Bias
We would like to mention that a possible drawback of our procedure is the fact that we could have selection bias due to missing information. Complete households that migrate together are not observable in our data set. The only households that we observe are those that migrate sequentially and hence the results obtained in this paper only apply to them. Unfortunately we do not have a way to control for this selection bias. Nonetheless we can try to show the direction of the bias under alternative scenarios. If the fraction of households that migrate together is relatively small among the total ‡ow of migrants then the selection bias should be relatively small and our results would still hold. However, if the fraction of households that migrate together is relatively large among the total ‡ow of migrants the direction of the bias could go either way. An upward bias of the coe¢ cient on the kidnap victimization probability may arise if those households that migrate together abroad do not take their migratory decision based on violence reasons. On the other hand, a downward bias may arise if violence in general is a important factor of the migratory decision for those households that migrate together.
6 Implications: positive selection and the costs of violence
The results obtained convey interesting implications on two separate strands of the economic literature: the migration and the violence and crime literature.
Migration and Positive Selection
Inside the migration literature, it is now generally accepted that people who migrate are not randomly selected from their country of origin. However, within the self selection theories, where agents take their migration decisions under an income maximizing framework, two di¤erent strands of the literature exist. While both strands agree that measures of income distribution in the home and in the host or destination country are crucial determinants of the type of self-selected migrants, they arrive at two completely opposite conclusions. Borjas (1987) argues that if the income distribution in the sending country is more unequal than in the receiving one, then the sending country will experience "negative selection". That is, in a more "unequal income" home country migrants will come from the lower tail of the income distribution since when they migrate to a more egalitarian economy they will be "insuring"themselves against negative income draws. On the contrary, agents from the upper tail of the income distribution in the home country prefer not to migrate since the destination country will "tax"them in the sense that they are less likely to obtain a higher than average income random draw in the destination country.
Recently Chiquiar and Hanson (2002) have shown that there could exist "positive, intermediate or negative selection" depending on the magnitude of the migration costs and on the distribution of schooling in the sending country. Based on census data from Mexico and the United States they …nd evidence against Borjas's negative selection hypothesis since in their study Mexican immigrants tend to have an education level that is above the mean education of the country. More speci…cally they …nd "intermediate selection" for Mexican-born men and positive selection for Mexican-born women. More recently, Liebig and Souza-Poza (2004) use data from 23 di¤erent countries from the 1995 International Social Survey Programme to test the two con ‡ict-ing hypothesis. Based on a question that reveals the "intentions to migrate" they …nd evidence that even when the origin country su¤ers from a highly unequal income distribution, positive selection of immigrants is expected. Furthermore, using the Gini coe¢ cient as an inequality measure they also …nd evidence that all else equal, as inequality increases there is on average a greater tendency to migrate although this incentive is attenuated for highly educated people. This last …nding also goes against Borjas's results since he claims that "as income inequality in the home country increases. . . ..the emigration rates decline."
Our theoretical model di¤ers from those in the literature mentioned above since it is based on agents who maximize a utility function which depends on several factors and not only on income. However, implications on the type of self selected migrants can still be obtained. Assuming that migration costs are a constant fraction of households income, the results provide evidence in favor of a "positive selection"in the quality of urban Colombian immigrants. Intuitively one could argue that highly educated and wealthy people in urban areas decide to leave the country to "insure" themselves against negative random security draws. In other words, kidnaps are "taxing"relatively high educated and wealthy urban households whom as a consequence will be more likely to migrate abroad. Table 8 shows some evidence of this. Model I is the model of a standard migration equation except the kidnap victimization probability. Model II repeats the results obtained from the last regression in the second stage and it is observed that both per-capita expenditure and education are positive and statistically signi…cant. Model III considers the kidnap victimization probability identi…ed by the other inequality measure (i.e. the proportion of households that have an income above the 60 percentile of the distribution within the neighborhood). In all speci…cations the education level is estatistically signi…cant. The evidence suggests that there may be a positive selection of urban migrants in Colombia. It should be noted that in order to conclude, in Borjas'terms, that e¤ectively there is a positive selection of immigrants from Colombian cities, information on the host country is also needed. Even though we do not possess this type of information, given that urban migrants are drawn from the upper tail of the education distribution we can positively reject that a negative or a refugee selection is taking place. Furthermore, since in Borjas' model it is theoretically not possible for migrants from the upper tail of the distribution in the home country to end in the lower tail of the host country distribution, the only possibility left is that 24 of positive selection for Colombian migrants. 
Costs of Kidnap Violence
Our results are also closely related to the violence and crime literature. One can divide this literature between those studies that try to explain what causes it and those that try to evaluate the costs they bring to society. While the …rst stage of our estimation procedure is related to the former literature, the positive selection result in the migration decisions is related to the latter one. If the kidnap risk is causing the migration of the wealthiest and more educated urban population of the country, a "brain and capital drain" may be taking place reducing the possibilities of economic growth.
To have an idea of the e¤ects kidnaps are causing in the distribution of education for the Colombian cities, we compare the actual distribution of education of those urban households that decide not to send any of its members with a hypothetical one where no risk of being a kidnap victim exist. To do this, we divided the households in four education groups according to the standard system of education in Colombia. The …rst group is composed by head of households without any formal education, the second group, which we call Primary, consist of those households whose head has at most …ve years of formal education while the third group, called Secondary, are those who have at least 5 years of education and at most eleven. Finally, those households whose head has at least some years of college education conform the last group. Figure 1 shows both the actual distribution of education of those households where none of its members decided to migrate and the predicted distribution given by our Model III of the second stage. As seen the model predicts a very good approximation of the actual education distribution.
What will be the e¤ect on the predicted schooling distribution of households that decide to stay in Colombia if no kidnap risk existed in the country? 16 Using a survey of 481 Colombian immigrants in the USA, Soto and Walker (2002) provide statistics which show that violence is the second most reported motive that induced these interviewed people to migrate. More recently, Gaviria (2005) , comparing data from the USA population Census and a Colombian household survey (ENH) for the year 2000, shows that Colombian migrants to the USA have on average three more years of education than those who decide to stay in the country.
Using the same coe¢ cients obtained under Model III in Table 5 but assuming that the probability of being a kidnap victim is zero for everyone, the results are depicted in Figure 2 and are quite signi…cant. Without the kidnap risk, on average the distribution of education for those households who decide not to migrate to an international destination will shift to the right. The percentage of individuals with high school education will increase by approximately 1.8%, those in the lowest education groups decrease while for college the change is almost nil. The results show that besides the obvious and very lamentable costs that violence as kidnaps brings to human life and to capital destruction, it is also causing a decrease in human capital that may have a negative impact on the growth path of the country and its development.
Conclusions
This paper provides an interesting link between the existing violence and migration literature through the use of income inequality. The results seem to support the idea that greater inequality may increase the likelihood of a household being a victim of kidnap. At the same time, the results also show that this likelihood has a positive and statistically signi…cant e¤ect on the international migratory decision of a household but no e¤ect on their domestic migration decision.
Our results are also closely related with the recent discussion in the migration literature on the type of self-selected migrants. As is now commonly acknowledged, we …nd that international migrants are not a random sample of the population. Furthermore, we obtain evidence that goes against Borjas's theory in which under a highly unequal economy migrants are normally drawn from the lower part of the income distribution. Instead, although due to di¤erent reasons, our results follow those from Chiquiar and Hanson (2002) . We …nd evidence that suggests that wealthier and more educated households are the ones who are leaving the country. It is claimed that these households decide to leave the country since the presence of violent acts is "taxing" them in a signi…cant manner. This latter result also suggests that there must exist economic loses of human capital for the Colombian economy which could eventually have a signi…cant impact on its growth path and future economic development. In particular, we show that if there is a (counterfactually) zero probability of being a victim of kidnapping the education distribution would shift to the right implying that not so many of the more than average educated households will send any of its members abroad.
The positive relation between inequality, crime rates and migratory decision does give rise to interesting policy implications. For example, the pro-targeting of the poorest population segments of the economy through income-transfer and/or micro-lending programs may increase social welfare by reducing the crime rate and therefore may also decrease the social welfare loss due to human capital endowment drain from the economy. Hopefully this paper will help motivate an interest in the prevention of crime and violence through social policies that have an e¤ect on the income inequality.
Future research is still needed on this subject. There is an urgent need for cleaner and richer data set in order to enrich the results obtained in this paper. Among the possible information that could be gathered are the following: the speci…c identity of the migrant and its international destination, information about the existence of migration-networks and the amount of remittances sent back to the families by those households who have sent some member out of the country could be very helpful.
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8 Appendix
A-Other Data from Encuesta Social
Encuesta Social also includes data on household characteristics such as the household total monthly income, the number of people in the household, the number of children in the household, if someone in the household is currently unemployed and the type of assets they own among other things. Even though we have information of each member of the household separately, we normally use household's characteristics as a whole. The only exception to this rule consists in the explicit use of the gender and the level of education of the head of the household. Table 3 in the appendix displays the mean and standard deviation of the most important control variables in the sample.
Throughout the empirical approach we make use of household's per capita monthly expenditure (in hundred thousands of the local currency) and not its total expenditure or income. We believe that per capita expenditure is a better measure of the actual income of the household than total expenditure since in Colombia wealthier households are normally composed by a smaller number of individuals. While in the lowest two per capita expenditure quintiles the mean number of individuals is at least four in the highest quintile the mean number of individuals is at most three. In other words, two households with the same total expenditure but di¤erent number of individuals should not be considered as households with the same income. Furthermore, Deaton (2000) suggests that expenditure is usually a more accurate control variable than self reported income since household's answers to the former have less measurement error than the answers to the later. 17 The mean monthly per capita expenditure within the sample is approximately seventy thousand pesos which amounts to almost US$30. It should be kept in mind however that due to data restrictions this expenditure only includes food and public services fees such as those for electricity and water. It does not include important expenditures on education and/or health.
Households can own di¤erent types of goods that can re ‡ect their wealth and their status. One of them for which we can control for is the ownership of a car. We constructed a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the household owns a car and zero otherwise. Only 13.74% of the households are car owners and they are normally in the higher end of the income distribution. For instance only 4% of the households in the lowest per capita income quintile own a car while almost 40% of those in the highest income quintile do.
Another variable that in principle may proxy wealth and status is business ownership. Almost 20% of the households in the sample own some type of business. However, under this category both big factories and small neighborhood shops may be included and hence only a small positive correlation between this variable and income is found. Looking at the data it can be seen that even though there is a tendency for households in higher income quintiles to own business, households from lower income quintiles are also owners. This may be due to the fact that the Colombian economy is characterized by having a big self-employed sector that is not a negligible percentage of the working population. For this reason we decided to construct an additional dummy variable that takes a value of one if the business the household owns has more than …ve workers and zero otherwise. Only 2% of the households in the sample satisfy this criteria and its correlation with income is relatively high (i.e. 0.25).
Additional controls that we used in the empirical speci…cation include the number of children in the household; whether any member of the household is unemployed at the moment of the survey; whether any member of the household is either independent or a patron, if the head of the household has ever migrated before and if the household had sold some of its assets in the past six months. Percentage change on the levels of education
